Figural Effects in a Syllogistic Evaluation Paradigm: An Inspection-Time Analysis. by Stupple, Edward J. N. & Ball, Linden J.
Figural Effects    1 
 
 






Figural Effects in a Syllogistic Evaluation Paradigm: 
An Inspection-Time Analysis 
 
 
Edward J. N. Stupple 
University of Derby, UK 
 
Linden J. Ball* 










Department of Psychology, Lancaster University, Lancaster, LA1 4YF. 
Tel: 01524 593470 
Fax: 01524 593744 
Email: L.Ball@lancaster.ac.uk 
Figural Effects    2 
 
Abstract 
Robust biases have been found in syllogistic reasoning that relate to the figure of 
premises and to the directionality of terms in given conclusions. Mental models 
theorists (e.g., Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991) have explained figural bias by assuming 
that reasoners can more readily form integrated models of premises when their middle 
terms are contiguous than when they are not. Biases associated with the direction of 
conclusion terms have been interpreted as reflecting a natural mode of reading off 
conclusions from models according to a “first-in, first-out principle”. We report an 
experiment investigating the impact of systematic figural and conclusion-direction 
manipulations on the processing effort directed at syllogistic components, as indexed 
through a novel inspection-time method. The study yielded reliable support for mental-
models predictions concerning the nature and locus of figural and directionality effects 
in syllogistic reasoning. We argue that other accounts of syllogistic reasoning seem less 
able to accommodate the full breadth of inspection-time findings observed. 
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Figural Effects in a Syllogistic Evaluation Paradigm:  
An Inspection-Time Analysis 
 According to mental models theory (MMT) people achieve deduction through 
three processing stages (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991). In the comprehension stage a 
model representing the information in the premises is constructed. In the description 
stage premises are integrated to formulate a putative conclusion. Finally, in the 
validation stage this conclusion is compared with alternative models of the premises 
to determine whether it has a counterexample. If no counterexample model is found 
the conclusion is accepted. Although the MMT of deduction has achieved substantial 
support from numerous studies (see Johnson-Laird, 2001), disputes remain over 
whether deduction might be better understood as involving a “mental logic” (e.g., 
Rips, 1994), or probabilistic Bayesian computations (e.g., Chater & Oaksford, 2001). 
 The present study tested MMT predictions about premise representation 
during deduction by monitoring the time people spent processing the components of 
categorical syllogisms. Such syllogisms consist of two premises and a conclusion, 
each containing one of four logical quantifiers that determine the problem’s mood 
(quantifiers are denoted by letters: A = All, E = No, I = Some, and O = Some…are 
not). A syllogism’s validity depends on the mood of the premises and conclusion and 
the order of the terms in the argument (its figure). We follow the convention 
(Johnson-Laird & Bara, 1984) of referring to syllogism terms as A, B and C, where A 
is linked to B in the first premise, B to C in the second premise, and A to C in the 
conclusion. Thus, four figures can be defined: AB-BC, BA-CB, AB-CB, and BA-BC.  
Figural Effects in Syllogistic Reasoning 
 Research has shown that a major influence on performance with categorical 
syllogisms derives from their figure. Figure can bias both performance accuracy and 
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directionality preferences for term orders in conclusions (Johnson-Laird & Bara, 
1984). Figure AB-BC is easiest to reason with, followed by BA-CB; the remaining 
figures promote increasing difficulty. The directionality biases seen in generated 
conclusions take the form of a preference for AC conclusion-term orders with AB-BC 
arguments and CA orders with BA-CB arguments. The other figures reveal no 
directional preferences. Examining figural effects is the key concern of the present 
study as they are critical to understanding the nature of human reasoning. Indeed, 
Dickstein (1978) argued that a theory of syllogistic inference would be incomplete 
without accounting for figural biases. Importantly, too, figural effects generalise 
beyond categorical syllogisms, having been observed in conditional inference 
(Grosset & Barrouillet, 2003), in tasks combining disjunctive, conjunctive and 
conditional components (Garcìa-Madruga, Moreno, Carriedo, Gutiérrez, & Johnson-
Laird, 2001), and in relational reasoning (Johnson-Laird & Bara, 1984). 
 Hunter (1957) was one of the first theorists to forward an explanation of 
premise-integration processes, albeit in the relational inference paradigm. Hunter 
proposed two mental operations to enable premise combination: (1) the conversion of 
terms within a premise, or (2) the mental reordering of whole premises. For the AB-
BC figure the middle terms fall adjacent to each other; the second premise easily 
integrates with the representation of the first, without recourse to mental operations. 
For the BA-CB figure the middle terms are not contiguous, so the formation of an 
integrated representation requires mental operations and is more difficult. Johnson-
Laird and Bara (1984) adopted Hunter’s proposals as part of the premise-integration 
process within the MMT of syllogistic inference. They consider reordering to be the 
dominant mental operation for the BA-CB figure, which results in its representation in 
the form CB-BA. The AB-CB and BA-BC figures are the most complex as they 
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require the conversion of a premise, which is argued to be more cognitively 
demanding and error prone than premise reordering (Bara, Bucciarelli, & Lombardo, 
2001; though see Roberts, Newstead, & Griggs, 2001, for evidence that conversion 
operations may play only a limited role in syllogistic reasoning). MMT explains 
directionality effects in conclusion generation by proposing that reasoners, having 
constructed integrated models where middle terms are contiguous, state conclusions 
based on a “first-in, first-out” (FIFO) principle (Broadbent, 1958).  
Stenning (2002), however, is critical of the MMT explanation of figural 
effects on conclusion order, and suggests that it is insufficient merely to claim a role 
for the FIFO principle without converging evidence. Moreover, he argues that 
substantiation of such a mechanism could not, in itself, be taken as definitive support 
for any particular representational system such as MMT. Indeed, the mental 
manipulations proposed by Hunter (1957) could be adopted as a component of any 
representational account of deduction that specifies the integration of premises. 
Notwithstanding these arguments, it remains that MMT is the only contemporary 
account of syllogistic reasoning that explicitly posits a working memory demand 
induced by figure1 that promotes figural biases on performance. Indeed, the concept 
of working-memory demand is central to the implementation of the description stage 
in the most recent computational model of MMT (Bara et al., 2001). 
 Some theorists argue that figural biases are a methodological artefact restricted 
to conclusion-production paradigms (Geurts, 2003; Rips, 1994; Wetherick, 1989), 
whilst others dispute that cognitive load is induced by figure (see Chater & 
Oaksford’s, 1999, probability heuristics model--PHM). For example, in response to 
Espino, Santamaría, and Garcìa-Madruga’s (2000a) evidence for figural effects based 
on the activation of end-terms in memory, Oaksford argues: “Their finding does not 
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address the issue of processing difficulty, so it is difficult to see how it bears on 
PHM’s prediction of no differences in processing difficulty between figures” 
(Oaksford, 2001, p. 208). Oaksford disputes the importance of Espino et al.’s results 
for the PHM, but indicates that if a measure of processing difficulty demonstrated a 
figural demand, this would challenge the current formulation of this model.  
 Espino, Santamaría, and Garcìa-Madruga (2000b) produced evidence for 
figure-induced processing demands with BA-CB relative to AB-BC syllogisms. They 
argued that processing difficulty with figure BA-CB should promote increased 
inspection times for the second premise from a MMT perspective. This prediction was 
supported using a sequential premise-presentation method that enabled the 
measurement of processing times for second premises. However, participants were 
unable to inspect: (1) the first premise after viewing the second, or (2) either premise 
after the conclusion. This method thus creates an additional working memory burden 
that may inhibit deployment of preferred reasoning strategies (Gilhooly, Logie, & 
Wynn, 2002). We note, too, that studies examining the ease of premise integration in 
temporal and spatial inference by measuring processing times for individual premises 
have also typically used sequential—rather than parallel—premise presentation 
(Carrieras & Santamaría, 1997; Morra, 2001; Vandierendonck & de Vooght, 1996), 
which may constrain the nature of preferred reasoning strategies (though see Roberts, 
2000; Schaeken & Johnson-Laird, 2000). Overall, we believe that concerns with the 
sequential presentation method point to the need for a replication of Espino et al.’s 
(2000b) study with a more flexible premise-presentation technique.  
Processing Direction in Syllogistic Inference 
 The figural effects we have outlined with categorical syllogisms dominate in 
the conclusion-production paradigm, where premises are given and conclusions 
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generated (e.g., Johnson-Laird & Bara, 1984). In contrast, figural effects are not well 
established in the conclusion-evaluation paradigm, where the validity of presented 
conclusion is assessed (e.g., Evans, Handley, Harper, & Johnson-Laird, 1999). MMT 
has tended to finesse distinctions between production and evaluation paradigms, 
instead emphasizing the stages of comprehension, description and validation. There 
is, however, an emerging theoretical debate as to whether processing in evaluation 
tasks involves either: (1) “forward reasoning” from premises to conclusion, as 
espoused in standard MMT and recent variants (e.g., Bucciarelli & Johnson-Laird, 
1999; Bara et al., 2001; Quayle & Ball, 2000); or (2) “backward reasoning” whereby 
the presented conclusion is used to guide construction of a model of the premises 
(e.g., Evans, Handley, & Harper, 2001; Hardman & Payne, 1995; Klauer, Musch, & 
Naumer, 2000). The backward-reasoning view is clearly rather different to the 
standard MMT claim that premise-driven processing underpins syllogistic inference2. 
 One response to this debate is the suggestion (Morley, Evans, & Handley, 
2004) that whilst backward reasoning prevails in conclusion-evaluation tasks (as 
presented conclusions can motivate inferential processes), forward reasoning 
dominates in conclusion-production tasks (as there is no given conclusion to guide 
processing)3. This proposal provides a compelling account of why figural effects on 
response accuracy appear in conclusion-production tasks, but are weak or absent in 
evaluation tasks. Despite Morley et al.’s (2004) claimed support for this position, few 
studies have systematically examined figural effects in evaluation tasks (but see 
Dickstein, 1978, for an account of figural effects in a multiple-choice task). The main 
evaluation-task studies have been those by Evans et al. (2001) and Quayle and Ball 
(2000), which focused primarily on belief bias effects rather than figure per se. It 
may, therefore, be premature to dismiss either the influence of figural effects in the 
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evaluation paradigm or the possibility that forward reasoning processes may dominate 
in both evaluation and production paradigms. 
Overview of Methodology and Predictions 
 Our experiment was devised to replicate and extend Espino et al.’s (2000b) 
study by implementing a more flexible process-tracing method. We employed a 
technique whereby clicking a mouse cursor on designated screen areas revealed 
syllogistic components and enabled computer-logging of inspection times. Once the 
cursor was moved from an active screen area the syllogistic component was 
immediately re-masked. This approach was inspired by mouse- and eye-tracking 
studies of the Wason Selection Task (Evans, 1996; Ball, Lucas, Miles, & Gale, 2003) 
and, in particular, the “mouse-contingent display” technique pioneered by Schroyens, 
Schaeken, Fias, & d'Ydewalle (1999, 2000) for studying on-line propositional 
reasoning processes (see also Roberts & Newton, 2001).  
 These methods are all predicated on the assumption that inspection times 
provide a direct measure of the processing effort devoted to problem components 
being gazed at. In studying reasoning with categorical syllogisms various predictions 
can be examined with inspection-time data. According to the standard MMT, AB-BC 
syllogisms are easier to process than BA-CB ones, and should be associated with 
lower premise inspection times. However, backward-reasoning theories predict no 
inspection-time imbalance across figures, as conclusion-driven strategies will not 
entail re-representation of premises in the BA-CB figure to form an integrated model. 
In addition, standard MMT also predicts that participants prefer AC conclusions for 
AB-BC syllogisms and CA conclusions for BA-CB syllogisms. Accordingly, non-
preferred conclusions may be associated with longer inspection times. Again, no such 
inspection time imbalance is predicted by theories emphasising backward-reasoning. 
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 In relation to the validity status of conclusions it is also possible to derive 
inspection-time predictions from MMT variants. Some theorists posit no inspection-
time differences across components of valid and invalid problems because only a 
single possible model is considered in either case (e.g., Evans et al., 2001). Others 
(e.g., Quayle & Ball, 2000) predict lower inspection times for components of valid 
problems because they require the consideration of only a single model to be 
accepted, whereas invalid problems require further model construction to refute the 
fallacy. Thompson, Striemer, Reikoff, Gunther, and Campbell (2003) likewise predict 
lower inspection times for valid conclusions. They suggest (cf. Evans et al., 2001; 
Klauer et al. 2000) that reasoners only search for a single model that is consistent with 
a conclusion, but find this easier for valid conclusions (because all models of the 
premises are consistent with these) than for invalid conclusions (where only some 
models are consistent). Yet another construal, based on the standard MMT, is that in 
order to accept a conclusion as valid all possible models require consideration, 
whereas invalid conclusions require discovery of only a single disconfirming model to 
be rejected. Thus, interesting oppositional predictions are possible concerning the 
level of scrutiny that will be directed at the components of valid and invalid problems. 
Method 
Participants 
 Forty-four psychology students (aged 18 to 45) from the University of Derby 
gained course credit for participation. None had prior knowledge of reasoning research. 
Design and Materials 
 The experiment involved a 2 x 2 x 2 repeated-measures design that manipulated 
Figure (AB-BC vs. BA-CB), Mood (IEO vs. EIO), and Validity (valid vs. invalid). The 
dependent measures were conclusion-acceptance rates and inspection times for the 
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components of presented syllogisms (i.e., Premise 1, Premise 2, and Conclusion). 
Participants were presented with eight target syllogisms (four in figure AB-BC; four in 
figure BA-CB) in the moods IEO and EIO. Half the problems were presented with a 
logically valid conclusion, and half with an invalid possible strong conclusion (Evans et 
al., 1999). IEO problems have a valid Some A are not C conclusion and an invalid Some 
C are not A conclusion, whilst the reverse holds for the EIO problems. There were four 
practice items in the moods AEA, III, IAI and AEE. The content of all syllogisms was 
neutral, and involved arbitrary combinations of professions, pastimes, and hobbies. The 
order of problems was partially counterbalanced and content was systematically rotated 
through the different problem forms. Authorware 5.1 running on Windows PCs was 
used to present instructions and problems and to record responses and inspection times. 
Procedure 
 Participants were presented with the following computer-based instructions: 
“This is an experiment to test people’s reasoning ability. You will be shown 16 
reasoning problems. For each problem there will be three masked statements. These will 
be labelled ‘Premise 1’, ‘Premise 2’ and ‘Conclusion’. By clicking your mouse on the 
masked areas you can reveal the statements. For each problem you are asked if the 
conclusion given below the premises may be logically deduced from them. You should 
answer this question on the assumption that the two premises are, in fact, true. You may 
revisit each of the three masked areas as many times as you wish although you cannot 
view more than one area simultaneously. [An example problem was presented at this 
point]. If, and only if, you judge that the conclusion necessarily follows from the 
premises, you should click ‘Yes’; if you judge that it does not necessarily follow you 
should click ‘No’. Please take your time and be sure that you have the right answer 
before giving your response. After each trial a box will appear saying ‘Click to 
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continue’. Do this when you are ready to proceed. The first four trials are practice 
items”. 
Results and Discussion 
Conclusion-Acceptance Rates 
 Statistical assessment of conclusion-acceptance rates (Table 1) using Analysis of 
Variance (ANOVA) revealed a reliable main effect of Validity, with valid conclusions 
being accepted more frequently than invalid ones (68% vs. 52%), F(1, 43) = 5.09, MSE 
= .541, p = .029. No other effects or interactions were evident. Acceptance rates for the 
present syllogisms are similar to previous conclusion-evaluation studies (e.g., Evans et 
al., 1999). The main effect of Validity supports the view that people have a modicum of 
deductive competence on this task whilst simultaneously being biased toward accepting 
conclusions not strictly warranted by the given premises (Evans & Over, 1997). 
 (Table 1 about here) 
Inspection Times 
 Table 2 summarizes inspection-time data relating to syllogistic components 
collapsed over correct and incorrect conclusion-evaluation responses (cf. Thompson et 
al., 1993, for evidence that time-based measures in syllogistic inference are comparable 
between collapsed data and correct-only data). Descriptive analysis revealed that data 
were positively skewed. A square-root transformation reduced this skew successfully, 
and statistical analyses were performed on transformed data. For clarity of interpretation 
we report inspection-time means throughout the paper both before transformation and 
converted back into original units (seconds) after transformation.  
(Table 2 about here) 
Premise inspection times. An ANOVA was conducted on premise inspection-
time scores using the factors of Figure (AB-BC vs. BA-CB), Validity (valid vs. invalid), 
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and Premise Component (Premise 1 vs. Premise 2), and collapsing across Mood. This 
revealed a reliable main effect of Figure, F(1, 43) = 6.08, MSE = 0.729, p = .018, with 
premises in the BA-CB figure inspected for longer than premises in the AB-BC figure. 
This result indicates increased processing demands associated with premises when 
middle terms are non-contiguous, and supports the critical MMT prediction that 
additional mental manipulations are required to align such premise terms (Johnson-
Laird & Bara, 1984). The analysis failed to support a main effect of Validity, F(1, 43) = 
2.39, MSE = 0.507, p = .13, although the mean cumulative premise inspection time for 
valid syllogisms (13.97 s after transformation) was less than that for invalid syllogisms 
(15.23 s after transformation). There was no significant effect of Premise Component, 
F(1, 43) = 1.27, MSE = .359, p = .28. 
 An assessment of the specific locus of premise-based inspection-time effects 
was possible by examining the data for the presence of an interaction between Premise 
Component (Premise 1 vs. Premise 2) and Figure (AB-BC vs. BA-CB). For syllogisms 
in the BA-CB figure the greatest inspection time should arise for Premise 1 as this 
needs to be both refreshed and integrated with the representation of Premise 2 (Johnson-
Laird & Bara, 1984), whereas inspection times for two premises in the AB-BC figure 
should be similar to one another as Premise 2 simply needs to be integrated with the 
current representation of Premise 1. The mean values depicted in Table 2 suggest that 
this pattern of premise-inspection times is evident, and an ANOVA revealed that the 
interaction between Premise Component and Figure was reliable, F(1, 43) = 4.36, MSE 
= 0.149, p = .043. LSD main effects analyses demonstrated a significant difference 
between Premise 1 viewing times in the AB-BC figure compared with the BA-CB 
figure (p = .007), with the latter being higher than the former. There was no significant 
difference between Premise 1 and Premise 2 inspection times for the AB-BC figure, 
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although there was a near significant difference between Premise 1 and Premise 2 
inspection times for the BA-CB figure (p = .072), with Premise 1 having the larger 
mean viewing time, as per MMT predictions. 
 Conclusion inspection times. Our analyses of conclusion inspection times were 
devised: (1) to test the MMT prediction of increased inspection times for conclusions in 
a non-preferred direction relative to a preferred direction (reflecting a conflict between 
the directionality of presented conclusion terms and the directionality of terms in mental 
models), and (2) to examine validity effects on conclusion inspection times as the 
presence of processing differences for valid and invalid conclusions is informative 
about the status of different contemporary variants of MMT. Conclusion inspection-
time data are presented in Table 3, collapsed across Mood and Figure. An ANOVA 
revealed a reliable main effect of Conclusion Direction, F(1, 43) = 7.40, MSE = .35, p = 
.009, with non-preferred term directions being inspected for longer than preferred ones. 
There was also a reliable main effect of Validity, F(1, 43) = 6.02, MSE = .516, p = .018, 
with invalid conclusions being viewed for longer than valid ones. Conclusion Direction 
and Validity were not found to interact, F(1, 43) = 0.26, MSE = .49, p = .61. 
(Table 3 about here) 
    General Discussion 
 Our study tested predictions based on the standard MMT of syllogistic 
reasoning (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991), including the claimed role of forward-
reasoning processes that begin with premise modelling and progress to conclusion 
examination. Under this view, problem figure impacts directly on the processing 
effort required to formulate models of premises, and figural influences should 
generalise across conclusion-production and conclusion-evaluation tasks. To date, 
however, studies that have used an evaluation paradigm (Evans et al., 2001; Morley et 
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al., 2004; Quayle & Ball, 2000) indicate that figure has a limited influence on 
conclusion acceptance rates, though few studies have examined more subtle 
processing-time measures. Recently, too, it has been suggested that evaluation tasks 
may be less biased by figure than production tasks, as the former may be dominated 
by conclusion-driven processes (e.g., Morley et al., 2004).  
 Our experiment focused on the evaluation paradigm and assessed whether the 
figure of categorical syllogisms impacts the processing of problems components (i.e., 
premises and conclusions). The study involved an inspection-time methodology 
similar to that pioneered by Espino et al. (2000b), but enhanced to allow recursive 
inspection of previous problem components post-activation to enable detection of the 
precise locus of figural effects on processing. Moreover, the flexibility to visit and 
revisit premises and conclusions facilitated the examination of the specific syllogistic 
components that are associated with relatively longer or shorter inspection-times and 
the testing of processing effects relating to preferred versus non-preferred conclusion 
directions predicted under MMT (e.g., Johnson-Laird & Bara, 1984). 
 A key prediction derived from the standard, premise-driven MMT was that 
there should be increased viewing of the premises of BA-CB problems relative to AB-
BC ones, because BA-CB premises require an additional mental operation (re-
ordering Premise 1 after Premise 2) to bring middle terms into contiguity. This 
finding was supported. MMT also permitted a more fine-grained prediction to be 
made: For syllogisms in the BA-CB figure, increased viewing times should arise for 
Premise 1 relative to Premise 2 since it is the representation of Premise 1 that must be 
refreshed prior to integration with the representation of Premise 2. For the AB-BC 
figure there should be no marked difference in viewing times for the two premises, 
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which can be integrated in a straightforward manner. The predicted interaction pattern 
between figure and premise component was evident in the inspection-time data. 
 A final prediction from MMT related to directionality biases associated with 
the processing of presented conclusions relative to the assumed order of premise 
terms in models. We predicted increased inspection times for conclusions whose 
terms were in a non-preferred direction versus conclusions whose terms were in a 
preferred direction. This is because participants would be expected to linger longer 
over conclusions in non-preferred directions, whilst engaging in a process of scanning 
models in a cognitively demanding right-to-left direction rather than the more natural 
left-to-right direction assumed under a FIFO principle (Johnson-Laird & Bara, 1984). 
This effect was reliable. Overall, the MMT view of syllogistic inference as a forward, 
premise-to-conclusion process achieves good support from our inspection-time data. 
 We next consider evidence for predictions derived from recent variants of the 
MMT of syllogistic inference (Hardman & Payne, 1995; Quayle & Ball, 2000), which 
propose that valid conclusions can be endorsed as necessary without the need for 
alternative models to be formulated, whereas invalid but “possible” conclusions 
require multiple-model construction (see Thompson et al., 2003, for an identical 
prediction based on an alternative MMT account). As such, invalid problems might be 
expected to be associated with greater premise refreshing and increased conclusion 
scrutiny in order for models to be actively maintained and fleshed out in working 
memory, and compared with given conclusions. The predicted validity effect on 
premise inspection times was in the correct direction but was not significant, whereas 
the influence of validity on conclusion inspection times was highly reliable. 
 Overall, our experiment supports key processing assumptions of MMT in its 
standard form (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991) and some its recent variants that also 
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propose forward-reasoning processes in the evaluation paradigm (e.g., Quayle & Ball, 
2000). The figure of a syllogism has detectable influences on premise and conclusion 
processing in a syllogistic-evaluation paradigm, even though such effects have limited 
impact upon acceptance rates, which remain stable across the relatively “easy” figures 
studied here (AB-BC and BA-CB). The validity status of syllogistic conclusions also 
has a demonstrable effect on conclusion processing and conclusion-acceptance rates. 
 Evidence for figural influences in an evaluation paradigm runs counter to 
claims (Morley et al., 2004) for a dissociation between processing direction in 
conclusion-evaluation versus conclusion-production tasks. Morley et al. propose that 
forward reasoning dominates in the conclusion-production paradigm, whereas 
backward reasoning prevails in conclusion-evaluation. Our evidence for figural 
effects on processing in the evaluation paradigm is not easily reconcilable with this 
position. However, Morley et al.’s use of belief-oriented materials might explain the 
discrepant findings across studies (see also Ball, Phillips, Wade, & Quayle, 2006, for 
eye-tracking evidence of conclusion-driven processing in a belief-bias paradigm). 
Belief-oriented conclusions may compel reasoners toward a conclusion-driven 
process, whereas neutral conclusions may instead promote a premise-driven process.  
 Although our evidence for a figure-induced working-memory load is 
inconsistent with several contemporary theories, we agree with Stenning (2002) that 
this does not provide fundamental evidence against the core principles of accounts 
that emphasise either rule-based or heuristic processes operating on syntactic aspects 
of presented information. In fact, the reordering processes proposed by Hunter (1957) 
could be appended to alternative representational accounts such as those based on 
mental logic or Euler circles. Moreover, Stenning and Yule (1997) suggest that spatial 
arrays or verbal lists are plausible explanations of the memory implementation in 
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syllogistic reasoning, although these mechanisms require more detailed specification 
to account for all of our premise inspection data. Ford (1994) proposed an algebraic 
substitution procedure that would certainly incur a demand on working memory. 
However, this explanation was not corroborated by data presented by Espino et al. 
(2000a) based on their experiments testing the activation of end terms, which 
supported a premise-reordering manipulation. Finally, some theorists propose that 
figural bias in syllogistic reasoning stems from a rhetorical principle based on the 
tendency for people to use as the subject of the conclusion a term that has appeared as 
the subject of one of the premises(e.g., Wetherick & Gilhooly, 1990; see also Chater 
& Oaksford’s, 1999, probability heuristics model). While such theoretical positions 
have not previously been associated with the notion of a cognitive load, it has recently 
been suggested (Oberauer, Hörnig, Weidenfeld, & Wilhelm, 2005) that an inadvertent 
selection of a middle term from the first premise as the subject of the conclusion may 
occur in the figure BA-CB, and that this putative subject term would require revision 
upon the reading of the second premise and the realisation that it is, in fact, a middle 
term. Such a process could explain increases in premise inspection times. 
We acknowledge that most theories of syllogistic reasoning might well be able 
to extrapolate their central principles to provide an account of figural influences on 
premise and conclusion processing in a way that could accommodate inspection-time 
effects as seen in the present study. It remains for the advocates of these theories to 
meet this challenge. However, we would argue that it is to the credit of mental models 
theory that it alone successfully predicted the full range of inspection-time evidence 
observed in our study.  
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 1 Ford (1995) suggests an explanation of figural effects in the form of a 
“verbal algebra”. Although this theory does not directly specify working memory 
involvement, it does lend itself to an implicit assumption that working memory loads 
may be associated with figural influences on performance. 
 2 The contrast between forward and backward processing described here refers 
to premise-driven versus conclusion-driven processing as defined by Morley, Evans, 
and Handley (2004), rather than the distinction applied by Dickstein (1978) when 
contrasting subject-to-predicate and predicate-to-subject processing with classical 
syllogisms. 
 3 We are mindful to refer to the possibility that forward and backward 
reasoning may dominate processing in syllogistic reasoning rather than proposing that 
reasoning would be observed to be deterministically in either form. We recognise the 
inherent flexibility of much cognitive processing (e.g., Siegler, 1996) such that it 
would make little sense to predict that all participants will perform the same way on 
all presented tasks, or, indeed, that individuals will behave the same on all trials. 
Instead, our research on figural effects focuses on the prevailing processing approach 
used in the evaluation paradigm. 
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Table 1 
Percentage of Conclusion Acceptances as a Function of Figure, Mood,  and 
Conclusion Validity  
           Figure AB-BC         Figure BA-CB  
Conclusion validity   IEO  EIO  M  IEO  EIO  M 
Valid 
 
68 55 62  75 71 73 
Invalid 
 
54 50 52  45 59 52 
M 61 53 57  60 65 63 
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Table 2 
Mean Inspection Times (in Seconds) for Components of Syllogisms as a Function of Figure, Mood, and Conclusion Validity  
                                           Figure AB-BC  Figure BA-CB 
 IEO EIO M       IEO EIO M 
 Syllogism component ND TD ND TD ND TD       ND TD ND TD ND TD 
Valid              
   Premise 1 6.44  5.20 8.97 7.29 7.70 6.25 7.74 6.97 9.06 7.78 8.40 7.38 
   Premise 2 6.43  5.62 8.62 6.97 7.52 6.30 8.02 7.18 6.68 5.76 7.35 6.47 
   Conclusion 5.68 4.93  6.76 5.90 6.22 5.42 5.25 4.67 4.82 4.33 5.03 4.50 
Invalid              
   Premise 1 7.95 6.50 6.97 6.15 7.46 6.33 10.59 8.82 9.49 8.12 10.04 8.47 
   Premise 2 8.28 7.13 6.80 5.66 7.54 6.40 8.8 7.78 8.49 7.56 8.64 7.67 
   Conclusion 7.26 6.10 5.15 4.49 6.21 5.30 6.97 6.20 7.64 6.50 7.31 6.35 
Note. ND  = natural data in seconds. TD = transformed data (square root of natural data) converted into original measurement units (seconds). 
Standard errors for the natural data ranged from 0.46 to 1.52, and from 0.11 to 0.20 for transformed data. Standard errors have been omitted from 
the table to aid readability.
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Table 3 
Mean Inspection Times (in Seconds) for Conclusions as a Function of Validity 
and Conclusion Order, Collapsed across Mood and Figure 
                           Conclusion order 
 Preferred Non-preferred M 
   Validity ND TD ND TD ND TD 
Valid 5.25 4.63 6.01 5.23 5.63 4.93 
Invalid 6.06 5.35 7.45 6.30 6.76 5.83 
M 5.66 4.99 6.73 5.77   
Note. ND  = natural data in seconds. TD = transformed data (square root of 
natural data) converted into original measurement units (seconds). 
Standard errors for the natural data ranged from 0.52 to 0.83. For transformed 
data they ranged from 0.10 to 0.14. 
 
